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Abstract
Carol Gilligan’s seminal critique of Kohlberg’s model of 
human moral development set on course a major current 
of postmodern ethical thinking. In a short time, it left 
in its wake a range of adaptations and elaborations in 
numerous disciplines, under the title of ‘relational ethics’. 
One of these adaptations is the “relational narrative” of 
the philosopher nurse, Sally Gadow, which she proposes 
as “the postmodern turn in nursing ethics.” Like that of 
Gilligan, Gadow’s work is a critique of (rational) ethical 
universalism, which purportedly focused on developing 
and applying a theory of the ‘good’ to all moral situations. 
On the contrary, argues Gadow, every moral engagement, 
such as that between a nursing professional and a patient, 
comes with inherent unique features that render any 
attempt at universalization impotent. Every clinical 
situation is defined by the ability of the professional to 
engage the client in an intimate, caring relationship that 
enables healing to take place. Thus, like Gilligan, Gadow 
aimed to make a clean break from the past, which was 
dominated by what she referred to as ethical rationalism, 
by replacing it with the relational approach to ethics, 
which is based on sympathetic and emotional engagement 
of patients in the clinic. This paper argues that Gadow’s 
acclaimed break from the past has not been completely 
successful. Juxtaposing Gadow’s work with the ideas of 
the earlier scholars she criticizes, the paper found traces 
of universalist, rationalist assumptions in her thought 
going as far back as Descartes and Kant, down to Rawls 
and Kohlberg. Sources of data for this study were library 
and archival materials, as well as secondary (Internet) 
resources, which were subjected to critical and content 
analysis.
Key words: Care; Ethics; Gadow; Relational 
Narrative; Universalism
O d o z o r,  U .  S . ,  O b i l o r,  N .  H . ,  &  O d o z o r,  N .  V.  ( 2 0 1 9 ) . 
R a t i o n a l i s m  i n  S a l l y  G a d o w ’s  A n t i - R a t i o n a l i s t  N u r s i n g 
Ethics. Canadian Social Science, 15 (4), 30-37. Available from: 
h t tp : / /www.cscanada .net / index.php/css /ar t ic le /v iew/10991 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/10991
INTRODUCTION
This paper is a critical exposition of Sally Gadow’s 
“relational narrative” theory of nursing ethics, which 
holds that the nursing profession would better attain its 
goals of caring for, and bringing healing to, patients if 
nurses became emotionally engaged, or related more 
closely, with their clients than if they simply continued to 
resort to extant rational ethical principles and universal 
standards laid down by philosophers, as has hitherto been 
the practice. The objective of this paper is to determine 
the merits and implications of this new approach for ethics 
and the extent to which it portends a threat for twenty-
first century philosophical ethics. Relational narrative, as 
espoused by the philosopher nurse Gadow, is basically an 
attempt to deconstruct ethics, as represented by prominent 
philosophers, such as Kant, Mill, Moore and Rawls, and 
psychologists, such as Lawrence Kohlberg, all of whose 
ethics Gadow overruled as “rational ethical universalism.” 
Gadow’s relational narrative is a subset of relational 
ethics, or ethics of care, which has been a subject of keen 
interest in recent decades among nursing professionals, as 
well as clinical therapists and psychologists. The paper is 
organized as follows: first, Gadow’s relational narrative 
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is discussed and traced to the foregoing scholars, such 
as Immanuel Kant, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Lawrence 
Kohlberg, John Rawls, and Carol Gilligan, whose works 
had influenced her ideas. The next section explores 
subsequent elaborations of Gadow’s thought by prominent 
scholars in the health care profession, such as Vangie 
Bergum and Joanne D. Hess. The last section is the 
critique of relational narrative, as developed and proposed 
by Gadow. In conclusion, the paper submits that Sally 
Gadow’s work is an interesting and important offshoot of 
ethical discourse, but that it fails to make a clean break 
from mainstream rationalist ethical thought that went 
before it.
S A L LY  g A D O W ’ S  R E L AT I O N A L 
(NARRATIVE) EThICS
In a 1999 article, the philosopher nurse, Sally Gadow, 
discusses three layers of ethical approach that have been 
separately adopted in the nursing profession. The first 
is subjective immersion (ethical immediacy), which, in 
Gadow’s reckoning, corresponds to pre-modern ethics. 
This is where the nurse unreflectively plunges into a 
clinical situation, deriving the idea of what is good for the 
patient by immediately resorting to personal convictions, 
as informed by religion, custom, family tradition, or ethos 
of the profession. Gadow (1999:60) explains it as follows:
With a cultural, professional, or religious basis for certainty, a 
nurse intuits the good directly, without recourse to reflection. 
That immediacy is the phenomenon I call immersion: a nurse is 
immersed in a tradition that provides an ethical appraisal of the 
situation, as well as immersed in the situation itself.
The second layer is modern detachment (corresponding 
to rational, ethical universalism), in which the nurse, like 
a professional, simply adopts readily established rational 
ethical principles believed to be universally applicable 
across all similar, or related cases. An example of these 
principles is the widely accepted philosophical belief 
that individuals ought to be accorded equal respect due 
to “the rational autonomy” allegedly possessed by each 
person, for which they have to be treated “as ends in 
themselves” (Gadow, 1999:61). But ethical principles, 
though psychologically persuasive, lose their universality 
because they engender conflicting interpretations in actual 
clinic settings, due to the differing perspectives of those 
involved, and because blind application of principles 
strips persons and their situations of their unique, lived 
realities and experiences.
The third, known as relational narrative, is “the 
construction by patient and nurse of an interpretation that 
is their coauthored narrative describing the good they 
are seeking” (Gadow, 1996:8; cited in Hess, 2003:137). 
Described by Gadow (1999:57) as “the postmodern 
turn in nursing ethics,” this layer refers to the proposal 
that nursing professionals begin to engage their clients 
with a relatively high degree of empathy by trying, as 
much as possible, to understand and closely accompany 
their patients as subjects of clinical therapy, rather 
than as objects of mere clinical curiosity and interest. 
Professionals must appreciate the pains and troubles 
of patients, by accompanying the latter in the process 
of healing and recovery. Instead of standing aloof and 
detached from the patient in a fashion that is devoid of 
feelings and emotions, as instantiated by the application of 
abstract universal ethical principles of philosophers, and 
as demanded by the extant professional code of ethics, 
nurses can achieve better results by going beyond the 
sense of duty in order to develop an empathic relationship 
with their clients, viewing the latter as co-subjects of 
clinical therapy.
According to Gadow, both nurse and patient must—
as co-workers or co-authors—enter into a mutual 
relationship that enables them to create a narrative, or 
a story, embodying the true feelings and experiences of 
the patient, with the nurse not allowing his or her special 
training and expertise overshadow what the patient 
actually feels, or has to contribute to the process. Every 
clinical encounter comes with inherent peculiarities and 
uniqueness. It involves the reality, here and now, of a 
nurse and a patient, both of whom are embodied beings 
facing a real situation that differs in a number of ways 
from other situations. Each encounter or experience is, 
therefore, contingent and assumes no absolutely necessary 
form. Thus, the professional must be able to work with 
a client to reach “the good” of the situation, as explicitly 
defined by the peculiarities of each case and the particular 
circumstance of the client, rather than resort to rote 
application of abstract universal ethical principles that 
gloss over the uniqueness and the existential realities of 
these individuals in a clinical encounter.
Ethics and morality typically come into play in (inter-
subjective) human relationship; that is, in a situation 
where people treat each other in a certain way. This 
implies that relationship is inherent to ethics (Johnson, 
1989; Barcalow, 1994; Rachels, 2003). More importantly, 
it implies that aside from the ethical codes of the 
profession, a nurse is also engaged in a higher level 
of ethical experience with a patient. The idea of “care 
respect” is, for all intents and purposes, the common 
ground where the relational narrative theory resonates 
with Carol Gilligan’s ethics of care. Gadow (1999:63) 
describes this connection in her long-running critique of 
universal ethical rationalism:
Respect for persons as existential selves involves more than 
detached regard for abstract autonomy; it entails attentive 
discernment and valuing of an individual as unique. Dillon 
(1992[:120]) describes this discernment as care respect, because 
its valuing of particularity parallels that of care ethics. The 
valuing of persons requires perception of each one’s uniqueness, 
and perception involves engagement. In contrast to rational 
ethics, which demands detachment in order not to perceive 
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people concretely or respond to them personally, care respect 
conveys “cherishing, treasuring, profoundness of feeling.”
Rationalism ,  in the 17th century sense, is the 
epistemological persuasion that reason, prior to sense 
experience, is the valid means of gaining knowledge of 
the external world. It stood opposed to empiricism, which 
held that the senses are the means of knowing the world, 
rather than the faculty of reason (Hamlyn, 1967). Thus, 
Gadow’s application of the concept of rationalism in ethics 
is much broader than traditional philosophical rationalism. 
It includes, for example, Kant, the Utilitarians, Hare, and 
even Rawls, each of whom argued for some rationally 
derived theory of the good for humans in society, after due 
critical refection. Ethical rationalism, as conceptualized 
by Gadow, therefore, refers to all those ethical theories 
which tended to establish purported universal principles 
that are taken as applicable to every moral situation.
gADOW’S INFLUENCES
Although it is not explicitly stated, it is evident that 
the tradition Gadow alludes to in her critique of ethical 
rationalism is a long-established one that goes back, at 
least, to Immanuel Kant (1785/1953:70, 95-96), who 
projected his moral philosophy as maxims; the first 
maxim, as a “universal law”, and the second, as “respect 
for persons as ends in themselves,” due to the rational 
nature of humans. Besides, Kant’s ethics is known in 
philosophical circles and beyond as the “ethics of duty,” 
due to his insistence that sense of duty, rather than 
consequences or outcomes, is the driving force of human 
ethical conduct (Stratton-Lake, 2006:330). Another 
instance of this rational tradition is Utilitarianism, 
which bloomed in the nineteenth century with purported 
“Greatest Happiness Principle” that it proceeded to 
apply indiscriminately to all humans everywhere and in 
all moral circumstances (Barcalow, 1994:117; Rachels, 
2003:92). Early twentieth century ethics saw the unfolding 
of Personalism, which appreciated and emphasised the 
physical and genetic uniqueness of each person as mark 
of human dignity, and maintained that each person is 
an original and unique expression of human nature (for 
instance, MacMurray, 1935). Social theorists, such as 
Owens (1969:241), have contended for the “absolute 
rights [of humans] as persons” which must never be 
violated in any circumstance. Also, Rawls (1971: 3-4) 
is in consonance with Kant and the early social contract 
theorists (for example, Locke and Rousseau), against the 
Utilitarians (Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick), that humans 
are rational beings with rights “that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override”; rights which “are not 
subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social 
interests.” 
The underpinnings of this rationalist system influenced 
scholarly work farther afield. One of the particular areas 
that psychologists have made valuable contributions to 
the understanding of morality is in their work on the 
development of moral consciousness in young human 
beings. Lawrence Kohlberg (1958, 1984), for example, 
carried out a series of research that culminated in the 
formulation of his extensively discussed six stages of 
moral development:
Stage 1: stark obedience to rules in order to avoid 
punishment
Stage 2: following reciprocal fairness rules for mutual 
benefit;
Stage 3: internalising rules and conventions of the 
family and peer group;
Stage 4: internalising norms and laws of society;
Stage 5: reasoning about the principles behind social 
laws; and, finally, 
Stage 6: reasoning purely from these principles, 
regardless of social or cultural norms.
For Kohlberg, just as for Kant and Rawls, the 
fundamental principles of moral reasoning included 
fairness, equality and justice; and moral development 
consisted in the personal, increasingly sophisticated 
understanding of these principles. However, Kohlberg 
persuaded that ethical approaches centering on character, 
values or virtues did not promote the development of 
moral reasoning, because, according to him, a well-
developed system of moral education should expose a 
person through the stages listed above.
Carol Gilligan (1982, 1990) promptly objected to 
Kohlberg’s theory. For her, it squarely focused on the 
moral development of young males, and overlooked that 
of girls. She reckoned that gender plays a central role 
in moral development of men and women, particularly 
because each gender interprets and conceptualizes moral 
issues somewhat differently. Simply put, men and women 
differ in their attitudes to moral situations. Kohlberg may 
be right that moral principles are important in ethical 
decision-making; but this only applies to the male folk, 
who typically go by “relying on formal rules and abstract 
principles to define right and wrong” (Macionis and 
Plummer, 2005:526). Men simply apply pure, abstract 
logical reasoning to determine which sorts of action and 
conduct are wrong or right, in order to reach conclusions 
about what is morally good or bad, what is the right 
thing to do in any circumstance. But women are led by 
the concrete circumstance in which a particular moral 
situation puts them. They ask whether blind application of 
justice, for example, would make a bad situation worse, 
hurt more people, increase the burden already borne by 
the moral agents, and so on (Rachels, 2003:162ff.). Thus, 
with women, ethics is approached from the perspective of 
care, responsibility and loyalty towards family, friends, 
personal relationships, society, and the like. Unlike men, 
who would stand from a distance and invoke the necessary 
ethical principles without sparing a thought for the 
peculiarities and contingencies of each moral encounter, 
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the female gender tends to relate closely with the ethical 
situation and get dissolved in it, in the process.
E L A b O R AT I O N S  O F  g A D O W ’ S 
ThOUghT
Gadow’s work has received some elaboration from 
contemporary scholars drawn to relational ethics. For 
example, Hess (2003) argued that Gadow’s relational 
narrative can, at bottom, be construed as a comprehensive 
moral guide that enables both nurse and patient to 
successfully navigate the entire process of clinical 
engagement. To achieve this, relational narrative must be 
cultivated ontologically and epistemologically; that is, 
it must be imbibed as “a way of being as well as a way 
of knowing for patient and nurse and … grounded in a 
subjectivity extending beyond socioculturally defined 
norms and role expectations” (p.147). Exploring the 
role of narrative in the realm of morality, Hess noted 
that not only is relationship foundational to the process, 
narrative lies at the heart of the encounter between the 
two healthcare stakeholders. She proffered this practical 
suggestion on how to go about this manner of clinical 
encounter:
Within a relational narrative, engagement allows the nurse to 
empathically understand the patient’s perspective and to share 
the ill person’s vulnerability by answering the question, ‘What 
is it like?’ What is it like to be ill, to gain health, to lose a loved 
one, to lose our selves to illness, to suffer until a new self and a 
new story are crafted? The only way to understand others and 
their experience and world is to engage them as subjects, not as 
objects of our care (p.146).
The process, once appropriately set on course, 
continues to serve as a safe habour, so that even if the 
ultimate goal of the encounter does not materialize as 
fast as expected, both nurse and patient will be able to 
navigate “through the vulnerability emanating from the 
illness experience” (p.147).
Bergum (1992) observed that the essence of nursing 
and medicine is to assist individuals to heal themselves; 
but this means something different from person to person, 
thus, necessitating the rise of relational ethics. Emphasis 
on the notion of rights has clearly produced some benefits 
in clinical practice, including the rights of the patient to 
self-determination, informed consent, proper procedural 
education, and the like. However, closer examination 
reveals that rights-based ethic sooner than later “leads to 
a flattening and narrowing of our human life” because 
it inherently inhibits patient-nurse intersubjective 
relationship, which is the bedrock of relational method 
of clinical therapy (p.75). To be relationally ethical with 
a patient in practice, Bergum suggested, the professional 
needs to attend to certain specific questions, such as: 
What kind of relationship is important in the clinical situation? 
What makes for right and good health care relation? What must 
the professional be and do? What are patients’ responsibility in 
the relationship? (p.75)
Bergum frowned at the fact that clinical procedure, 
over the decades, has tended to relegate the person of 
the patient to the background, while ‘strangers’, such 
as lawyers, an ethics committee, rights advocates, and 
the like, make the decisions by rigorously debating over 
what counts as good for the patient. In the media, human 
casualties of war and epidemic are cast as mere statistics, 
rather than as real people who have actually lost their 
lives. The media also mislead society by emphasizing 
the crises that erupts between adopted children and 
their adoptive parents, unwittingly sidetracking these 
children’s longing for “someone who looks like them … 
[which gives them] a better sense of themselves through 
experiencing renewed relation with their birth mother and/
or their genetic father” (Bergum, 1992:76-77; original 
emphasis). These different experiences, Bergum argued, 
point to the need for a relational approach in current 
bioethical thinking orientated towards the particularity 
and uniqueness of clinical encounters and the individuals 
involved. Thus, Bergum submitted that:
Ethical thinking in bioethics needs a new foundation with 
bricks formed by our understandings of the need for rights held 
together by our recognition of the need for care and relationship. 
Ethics built on this foundation moves past the rhetoric of rights 
(and its rational discourse) to a strong version of relationship 
(with its support of the moral relevance of emotion) toward 
a moral sense of love and respect in which one is caught by 
responsibility for the Other (p.79).
Bergum (2003:123) also discussed relational pedagogy 
and noted with concern that technology—though “the 
strength of modern medicine”—can easily become a 
dangerous trap disconnecting nurses from patients. 
Technology has the potentiality of rendering a practitioner 
insensitive to his or her patient’s needs; replacing human 
action with mechanical operation; separating knowledge 
from experience; and deadening the nurse’s emotions, 
making her to become less human. Power imbalance is 
another threat that can arise, due to the nurse’s position of 
privilege, expertise and control, over the patient. All these 
are obstacles in the path of progress in relational ethics. 
But nurses are encouraged to develop observational skills, 
so that by applying the use of all their other senses, such 
obstacles may be surmounted and these misgivings laid to 
rest. As Bergum (2003:126) put it:
[I]n the relational space where … nurse and patient improvise, 
power loses its power. In fact, instead of power (and its 
worrisome implications – control, domination, coercion), 
we find words like listening, initiative, creativity, example, 
appropriate moment, leadership, letting be, and respect.
Shaw (2011) explored how relational ethics may 
inform ideas about the values-driven problems presented 
by people in therapy sessions. She proceeded to draw 
upon the traditions of moral philosophy and ethics in 
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order to highlight ways of attending to values-driven 
issues that might be otherwise neglected. She found that 
despite our inclination to view morality as judgmental 
and rule driven, moral conduct and decision-making can 
involve imaginative, creative and aesthetic possibilities. 
For a period of about ten years, Doane and Varcoe (2005, 
2015) consistently applied the relational method of inquiry 
to family healthcare delivery and found it to be both 
satisfactory and rewarding, with minor adaptations and 
redesigning, as occasion may require. Pollard (2015) and 
Upasen (2017) identified the core elements of relational 
ethics to specifically include the following: (1) mutual 
respect, which refers to the capability for respecting 
others, and for self-respect, which elicits reciprocation; 
(2) engagement, referring to basic connection between 
nurse and patient, as facilitated by a sense of commitment, 
encouraging trust and openness; (3) embodiment, 
in relational ethics, is to the role emotion plays in 
ethical decisions and actions; and (4) interdependent 
environment, which is the requirement of relational ethics 
that we recognize that we exist interdependently in an 
environment. Attending to these elements can, as Upasen 
(2017:6) has phrased it, “augment the skills psychiatric 
nurses currently use to establish therapeutic relationships 
with clients, as well as foster ethical practice.” For Pollard, 
relational ethics marks a paradigm shift in clinical practice 
wherein people are seen as products of relationships, 
rather than as disjointed individuals. The ramification is 
that nursing is no longer about caring for the patient, but 
about caring with the patient. Carnevale, Teachman and 
Bogossian (2017) also applied relational ethics in their 
study of children with complex health care needs and their 
parents. They found that the children’s and their parents’ 
interests are relationally intertwined and interdependent, 
and also that relational ethics can serve as framework 
for promoting clinical practices that are ethically attuned 
to the complexity of the needs of such children. Most 
recently, Fritz and Holton (2019) criticized contemporary 
practice for relying more on ordering loads of medical 
examinations and clinical investigations for patients, which 
merely culminates in the dispensation of tons of drugs, 
arguing, instead, for openness, transparency and caring 
relationships that can engender enough trust and bring 
about healing, often at no extra financial cost to the client.
CRITIQUE
Gadow examines three layers of nursing ethics, leading 
her reader to expect that the rest of the paper would be 
focused on demonstrating exactly how the three layers 
may be effectively combined in clinical therapy. Naturally, 
this would endow the discussion with a high degree of 
neutrality and objectivity. Rather, one finds that Gadow’s 
paper is turgid with disdain for rationalism, in the fashion 
that has become associated with Gilligan (1982); disdain 
she makes no pretenses about. After a brief explanation of 
the first ethical cornerstone she calls ethical immediacy, 
Gadow launches a fierce and long-running attack against 
ethical rationalism, following which she introduces 
her favoured relational narrative. She then goes on to 
romanticize this third way, embellishing her argument 
with its apparent advantages over the first two layers. 
She does not dwell on any shortcomings of the favoured 
third way, or on the objections that may be advanced 
against it. At some point, Gadow calls for the combination 
of the three layers, perhaps realizing that reason and 
professionalism cannot be separated in nursing practice; 
but her ambivalence is already apparent in the fact that she 
simultaneously crowns relational narrative—that favoured 
third way—with the lofty title of the postmodern turn in 
nursing ethics, as noted earlier.
Albeit, even more interesting is the fact that a thread 
linking Gadow’s thought to those she criticizes can be 
traced through to Kant, perhaps up to Descartes. Descartes 
proposed the suspension of judgment and certainty about 
knowledge, except for those ideas that are “clear and 
distinct” in the process of cogito. He held that knowledge 
of, and certainty about, existence can only emanate from 
the thinking individual, who would then proceed to 
determine what is true (for themselves) from this already 
logically established basis (Descartes, 1997:176ff.). These 
ideas are the threshold of Gadow’s (1999:64) notion of 
“radical contingency,” according to which meaning is 
determined and created by the agents involved in a given 
relational setting. 
From here, Gadow’s locates Kant, whose ethics of 
respect for persons as ends in themselves is at the very 
basis of Gadow’s idea of engagement of the patient as co-
creator of relational narrative in the clinic; for how is the 
nurse supposed to engage a patient without due respect 
for him as a human subject, rather than an object of 
clinical curiosity? Gadow’s thought then moves on to the 
Humanists of the nineteenth century European philosophy, 
who emphasized human dignity and consciousness. It 
cuts through the existentialist philosophers, such as Sartre 
and Nietzsche, and connects Husserl, and then Merleau-
Ponty, whose phenomenology may also be used to 
further illustrate the depth of influence which Gadow has 
garnered.
In his most celebrated work, Phenomenology of 
Perception (1945/2012), Merleau-Ponty encapsulated 
the cardinal elements of relational ethics highlighted 
above, namely embodiment, engagement, interdependent 
environment and mutual respect. One of his main 
contributions to existential phenomenology is the unique 
emphasis on the body as the point of reference of all 
perceptive experience; a facet which other philosophers 
apparently took for granted and rarely discussed with 
the same level of content and detail. In fact, Merleau-
Ponty regarded the body as the basic, starting point of all 
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perceptual phenomena and experience. For him, the body 
is not just a biological or physical unit; rather, it is the 
body that structures our situation and experience within 
the world. It is by virtue of the body that perception 
precedes language, reason and thought. Though he does 
not use the precise term, the element of engagement is 
implicitly referred to in several places. For example, 
Merleau-Ponty stated in one of many passages that:
The phenomenological world is … inseparable from subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity, which establish their unity through the 
taking up of my past experiences into my present experiences, 
or of the other person’s experience into my own (p. lxxxiv).
Elsewhere, he wrote: “the body, by withdrawing from 
the objective world, will carry with it the intentional 
threads that unite it to its surroundings and that, in the 
end, will reveal to us the perceiving subject as well 
as the perceived world” (cited in Landes, 2012: xl). 
These excerpts make clear reference to thoroughgoing 
engagement of the professional nurse with the patient 
(“subject”); the excerpts convey the interdependency of 
the two, in terms of “intersubjectivity” and exchange of 
“experience”. The “phenomenological world” in which 
this exchange takes place captures the immediacy of the 
experience and environment, as well as bodily presence of 
nurse and patient, while the idea of “present experience” 
depicts the here and now of clinical encounter, as 
understood by Gadow. Mutual respect is implied in the 
very idea of taking up the other person’s experience 
into one’s own, as well as the themes of freedom and 
temporality which Merleau-Ponty treats at some length 
later in the work. These are bits of evidence of how 
deeply Gadow is influenced by the different philosophical 
traditions, including rationalism, even though the stakes 
are too high for these influences to be admitted.
If Kohlberg’s model of human ethical development 
is stereotyped, as Gilligan maintained, then so are care 
ethics and its near relative, relational ethics, particularly 
as articulated by Sally Gadow. Gilligan accused 
Kohlberg’s model of being male-oriented, and not 
reflecting women’s true moral psychology. To strike the 
purported balance, she discarded the rationalist blend 
of ethics presumably represented by Kohlberg, and 
proposed an ethic of care as the antidote that represents 
women’s view, attitude and response to ethical matters 
(Malan and Cilliers, 2004). Above, we saw that Gadow’s 
relational narrative shares some basic grounds with 
Gilligan’s care ethics in its valuing of care respect. 
With this close proximity of both women’s thoughts—
rationalist thinking being, as they have argued, the stock-
in-trade of the male folk—and care ethics designed, as it 
is, with women in mind, how would Gadow’s proposal 
apply to male nurses? Does Gadow suggest thereby that 
nursing is a decidedly female vocation, in which case 
her theory may equally be charged with the creation 
of stereotypes? This is, in fact, what most relational 
ethicists tacitly suggested when they depicted rationalism 
as a male trait, in the bid to argue for the ‘feminine’ 
nature of relational ethics. They basically leave us 
with no other choice except that between rationalism 
and ethics of care, with men and women strategically 
positioned on the respective sides of this divide. If this is 
so, then the arguments advanced by Gadow do not apply 
to male nurses, in which case her critique of rationalist 
ethics would not amount to much.
What exactly does it mean, in health care, for a nurse 
to engage in close relational narrative with a patient? This 
is a central question that has received diverse answers 
from independent relational ethicists. Yet the feasibility 
of relational narrative—as a proposal—squarely rests on 
how coherently the question is addressed. What precisely 
is involved in this interaction? Is it open communication, 
trust and friendship, as Fritz and Holton (2019) recently 
suggested? Or is it physical proximity, or tete-a-tete 
(Dowling, 2004; Wright and Brajtman, 2011; Alicea-
Planas, 2016)? Is it spiritual union (Pesut, 2009)? But 
none of these, in itself, guarantees sound practice any 
more than do the first two facets of Gadow’s ethical 
cornerstone; and, regrettably, Gadow does not seem to 
make this notion explicit enough. To be rational in nurse-
patient clinical experience does not, contrary to Gadow’s 
pessimism in this regard, imply absolute unfriendliness 
and cold detachment of nurse from patient. Among other 
things, it involves balancing out a clinical situation in 
the light of reason, instead of plunging headlong into it, 
guided merely by the emotions, or the ethical codes of 
the practice, culture, or the prevailing religious beliefs of 
the circumstance in which the professional is working. 
Whatever else may be the case, it basically means the 
deployment of good sense in approaching a clinical 
encounter, rather than doing so simply as a matter of 
duty or routine, since each case has its own peculiar 
history and uniqueness, as Gadow herself points out. So, 
the question is: What is wrong about that? Rationalism, 
as a philosophical movement, certainly has excesses, 
just as do all other philosophical theories; but it has 
been an irresistible temptation, among anti-rationalist 
philosophers, to jettison these excesses at the expense 
of the merits of rationalist philosophy, one of which 
is its identification of the critical role reason plays in 
human decision-making, in both ethical and non-ethical 
situations. Thus, if we insist on a dichotomy between 
reason and emotion, as proponents of care ethics and 
relational ethics apparently do, then the creation of 
alternative ethics (of care) for women—in which women 
are portrayed as typically emotionally inclined—tacitly 
suggests that women do not apply reason in ethical 
situations. Even more absurd is the fact that it portrays 
nursing as a profession devoid of reason, but full of mere 
human emotions and feelings.
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Beyond the question of the precise nature of intimacy 
involved in a relational encounter, there is a further, 
separate question of the exact extent to which a nurse 
can be close to a patient, in order to achieve the co-
creation of a relational narrative. What is the criterion, or 
yardstick, for determining when the closeness is adequate 
to elicit a narrative? Gadow emphasizes the elements of 
body and physicality as necessary means of the relational 
narrative process. How is this supposed to be achieved 
with regard to patients with chronic contagious diseases, 
knowing that the body is the medium by which such 
diseases are transferred from one individual to another? 
Diseases do not, it would seem, have an independent 
existence per se, but typically survive and thrive in living 
tissues, in this case, the human body. Thus, even if we 
granted, for the sake of argument, that the relational 
approach can fit into the matrix of treating patients with 
non-contagious diseases, what about those suffering from 
contagious diseases? In this case, strict adherence to the 
principles of relational narrative apparently would put 
the nurse in a dilemma: either leave this crop of patients 
out of consideration altogether; or the nurse should 
expose herself to the disease in the process of trying to 
engage the patient closely, as demanded by Gadow. The 
first is not an option, because the code of ethics of the 
nursing profession certainly requires practitioners to 
seek the well-being of the patient. This leaves us with 
the second. What if every nurse simply walked straight 
into a contagious disease, such as Ebola, and lost their 
life in the process, as did Nigeria’s remarkable Dr. Stella 
Adadevoh (Otufodunrin, 2018), just because they needed 
to engage their patients more intimately? It seems, 
then, that at a certain level, reason and professionalism 
are indispensable in nursing practice; that while it is 
important to care for the patient by making them to 
feel relaxed, the ultimate goal or purpose of that entire 
exercise, which is healing and recovery, is not any less 
important, and should not be disregarded in the bigger 
picture of clinical encounter and practice.
Finally, no matter how intimate the nurse may get when 
dealing with a patient, a certain degree of professionalism 
would always be both required and called for. If there is 
no rationality, then there is no professionalism, which 
is the only factor that enables the nurse to be of any 
discernible degree of use to the patient. Professionalism 
requires, at least, a minimal degree of “standing back” so 
as to correctly assess a clinical situation, in order to find 
suitable solution. Were the professional to lose sense of 
direction (a scenario that is both conceivable and possible, 
given that a professional is not an automaton, but a human 
being with feelings and emotions), it is professionalism 
that pulls him or her back from the brink. It is only 
professionalism—in terms of training and application of 
reason and resort to extant code of conduct—that keeps 
the clinical procedure and process on track. In all these, 
the part played by reason is absolutely indispensable. 
Ultimately, Gadow has thrown rationalism out the front 
door, and, so, would end up smuggling it in through the 
back door again. 
CONCLUSION 
Sally Gadow is a child of her times. She has been deeply 
influenced by both foregoing scholarship and that of her 
age. These influences were those of Gilligan and Merleau-
Ponty, and a horde of thinkers on the rationalist side, yet 
whose ideas she has tried so hard to jettison. But contrary 
to expectation, Gadow owes a lot to the perceived 
opponents she criticizes unsparingly in her work, because 
her work is almost unavoidably dotted with traces of their 
ideas. The good thing, however, is that Gadow (1999:59) 
apparently realizes some of these pitfalls, and tries to 
address them in the later part of her paper, for example, 
by allowing that the three layers of nursing ethical 
cornerstone be dialectical in nature; that is, that they act 
as checks and balances on one another, which makes 
them “no longer mutually exclusive, but … mutually 
enhancing.” But this later attempt is simply inconsistent 
with her long-running critique of universal ethical 
rationalism, and her overarching thesis that relational 
narrative is the postmodern turn in nursing ethics. More 
critically, it shows clearly that Gadow has not made a 
clean break from past ethical thinking; that her thought 
is incomplete without due consideration for rationalism. 
Thus, despite her distaste for rationalism, nuances of 
rationalism linger in her thought.
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